Secure device pairing

ABSTRACT

Techniques are disclosed relating to the secure communication of devices. In one embodiment, a first device is configured to perform a pairing operation with a second device to establish a secure communication link between the first device and the second device. The pairing operation includes receiving firmware from the second device to be executed by the first device during communication over the secure communication link, and in response to a successful verification of the firmware, establishing a shared encryption key to be used by the first and second devices during the communication. In some embodiments, the pairing operation includes receiving a digital signature created from a hash value of the firmware and a public key of the second device, and verifying the firmware by extracting the hash value from the digital signature and comparing the extracted hash value with a hash value of the received firmware.

This application claims the benefit of U.S. Prov. Appl. No. 62/276,933filed on Jan. 10, 2016, which is incorporated by reference herein in itsentirety.

BACKGROUND

Technical Field

This disclosure relates generally to computer systems, and, morespecifically, to secure communication between computing devices.

Description of the Related Art

Various protocols have been developed to enable short-rangecommunication between devices. In some instances, protocols, such asBluetooth™, may require a user to pair two devices before they cancommunicate with one another. This may include a user enabling bothdevices to discover one another and entering a code displayed on onedevice into the other device. If the displayed code matches the enteredcode, the devices may complete the pairing process and begincommunicating with one another. Under this communication paradigm, thecode entered by the user is employed to authenticate one device with theother.

SUMMARY

The present disclosure describes embodiments in which a pairingoperation is performed between two devices in order to establish asecure communication link between the devices. In various embodiments,the pairing operation includes a first of the devices providing firmwareto a second of the device that executes the firmware when itcommunicates over the secure link. In such an embodiment, the seconddevice may verify the firmware before it establishes a shared key usedto communicate with the first device. In some embodiments, the pairingoperation also includes a trusted entity providing signed data to thefirst device, which conveys the signed data to the second device. Insuch an embodiment, the signed data cryptographically binds a hash valueof the firmware to an identifier of the first device (e.g., a public keyof the first device). In some embodiments, upon verifying the signeddata, the second device derives the shared key using the identifier inthe signed data.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of system forpairing two computing devices.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a peripheraldevice to be paired with a computing device.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a computingdevice.

FIGS. 4A and 4B are communication diagrams illustrating embodiments ofpairing operations.

FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating one embodiment of a methodassociated with a pairing operation.

This disclosure includes references to “one embodiment” or “anembodiment.” The appearances of the phrases “in one embodiment” or “inan embodiment” do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment.Particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined inany suitable manner consistent with this disclosure.

Within this disclosure, different entities (which may variously bereferred to as “units,” “circuits,” other components, etc.) may bedescribed or claimed as “configured” to perform one or more tasks oroperations. This formulation—[entity] configured to [perform one or moretasks]—is used herein to refer to structure (i.e., something physical,such as an electronic circuit). More specifically, this formulation isused to indicate that this structure is arranged to perform the one ormore tasks during operation. A structure can be said to be “configuredto” perform some task even if the structure is not currently beingoperated. A “secure circuit configured to perform a cryptographicoperation” is intended to cover, for example, an integrated circuit thathas circuitry that performs this function during operation, even if theintegrated circuit in question is not currently being used (e.g., apower supply is not connected to it). Thus, an entity described orrecited as “configured to” perform some task refers to somethingphysical, such as a device, circuit, memory storing program instructionsexecutable to implement the task, etc. This phrase is not used herein torefer to something intangible. Thus, the “configured to” construct isnot used herein to refer to a software entity such as an applicationprogramming interface (API).

The term “configured to” is not intended to mean “configurable to.” Anunprogrammed FPGA, for example, would not be considered to be“configured to” perform some specific function, although it may be“configurable to” perform that function and may be “configured to”perform the function after programming.

Reciting in the appended claims that a structure is “configured to”perform one or more tasks is expressly intended not to invoke 35 U.S.C.§112(f) for that claim element. Accordingly, none of the claims in thisapplication as filed are intended to be interpreted as havingmeans-plus-function elements. Should Applicant wish to invoke Section112(f) during prosecution, it will recite claim elements using the“means for” [performing a function] construct.

As used herein, the terms “first,” “second,” etc. are used as labels fornouns that they precede, and do not imply any type of ordering (e.g.,spatial, temporal, logical, etc.) unless specifically stated. Forexample, in a processor having eight processing cores, the terms “first”and “second” processing cores can be used to refer to any two of theeight processing cores. In other words, the “first” and “second”processing cores are not limited to logical processing cores 0 and 1,for example.

As used herein, the term “based on” is used to describe one or morefactors that affect a determination. This term does not foreclose thepossibility that additional factors may affect a determination. That is,a determination may be solely based on specified factors or based on thespecified factors as well as other, unspecified factors. Consider thephrase “determine A based on B.” This phrase specifies that B is afactor is used to determine A or that affects the determination of A.This phrase does not foreclose that the determination of A may also bebased on some other factor, such as C. This phrase is also intended tocover an embodiment in which A is determined based solely on B. As usedherein, the phrase “based on” is thus synonymous with the phrase “basedat least in part on.”

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present disclosure describes embodiments in which devices are pairedwith one another in order to enable communication between devices. Asused herein, the term “pairing” is to be interpreted according to itsunderstood meaning in the art, and includes a process that establishes acommunication link between two devices. As will be described below, invarious embodiments, a pairing operation may be performed between twodevices that rely on a trusted, separate computing system to verify theidentities of one or both devices. If the trusted computing system isable to successfully verify the identities, the system may indicate thisto both devices, which may proceed to complete the pairing operationincluding the exchange of a shared key for secure communication over anestablished communication link. On the other hand, if the trustedcomputing system is unable to successfully verify the identities, thepairing operation may be discontinued before a communication link isestablished. In some instances, relying on a trusted computing system toauthenticate devices may be more secure than placing trust in a userattempting to pair devices—particularly if the user has maliciousintentions.

In various embodiments discussed below, the pairing operation may alsoinclude the communication of firmware from one device to another, wherethe firmware is to be executed by the receiving device duringcommunication over the secure link established in the pairing operation.In such an embodiment, the trusted computing system may provideinformation (e.g., signed data) attesting to the validity of thefirmware. In some embodiments, the receiving device may verify thereceived firmware against this provided information before exchanging ashared key in the pairing operation and executing the firmware. In someinstances, verifying firmware in this manner may provide additionalsecurity by reducing the risk that the device receiving the firmware maybecome compromised due to flawed firmware.

Turning now to FIG. 1, a block diagram of a system 10 for pairingdevices is depicted. In the illustrated embodiment, system 10 includes aperipheral device 110, computing device 120, and a trusted server 130.As shown, peripheral device 110 may include a controller 115, andcomputing device 120 may include a secure enclave processor (SEP) 125.In some embodiments, system 10 may be implemented differently thanshown.

Peripheral device 110, in one embodiment, is a device configured toperform input and/or output operations for computing device 120. Forexample, in one embodiment, device 110 includes a keyboard configured toreceive key presses from a user and convey that information to computingdevice 120. In another embodiment, device 110 includes a touch screenconfigured to display frames generated by computing device 120 as wellas receive user touch inputs. In some embodiments, device 110 may alsoinclude a biosensor configured to collect user biometric data such asdiscussed below with respect to FIG. 2. In various embodiments, device110 is configured to be decoupled from device 120. That is, device 110may initially pair with one device 120 and then subsequent pair withanother device 120. In some embodiments, device 110 may also beconfigured to be paired (i.e., communicate over established links) withmultiple devices in parallel. In some embodiments, device 110 isconfigured to couple to device 120 via a wired interconnect such as auniversal serial bus (USB). In other embodiments, device 110 isconfigured to couple to device 120 via a wireless interconnect such asone supporting Bluetooth™.

Computing device 120, in one embodiment, is a computing deviceconfigured to use the input/output (I/O) functionality of device 110.Accordingly, in one embodiment in which device 110 includes a keyboard,device 120 may be configured to perform various operations in responseto keys being pressed on the keyboard. In some embodiments in whichdevice 110 includes a biosensor, device 120 may be configured toauthenticate a user by comparing received biometric data with previouslystored biometric data from a user. Device 120 may be any suitablecomputing device such as desktop computer, laptop computer, mobiledevice (e.g., mobile phone, tablet, etc.), server computer, etc.

In various embodiments, devices 110 and 120 are configured to perform apairing operation that establishes a secure connection 122 between them.Accordingly, in such embodiment, the pairing operation may include thenegotiation of a cryptographic algorithm to be used (e.g., whether touse 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit advance encryption standard (AES)) andthe establishment of corresponding encryption keys to be used. Invarious embodiments, the pairing operation includes performance of a keyexchange, such as a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, in order toestablish a shared secret (e.g., an encryption key) used to encrypt anddecrypt information communicated over connection 122. In someembodiments, devices 110 and 120 are configured to perform an ellipticcurve DH (ECDH) exchange in which a shared key is established based onpublic-key pairs used by devices 110 and 120. That is, device 110 maydetermine the shared key based on a locally stored private key and apublic key received from device 120. Similarly, device 120 may determinethe shared key based a locally stored private key corresponding to thepublic key sent to device 110 and a public key that is received fromdevice 120 corresponding to device 120's private key. In someembodiments, cryptographic operations performed by device 120 (includingthe encryption and decryption of information sent over connection 122)is performed by SEP 115 shown in FIG. 1. As discussed below with respectto FIG. 3, in some embodiments, SEP 125 is a dedicated secure circuitconfigured to securely store encryption keys used by device 120 andincludes circuitry for performing cryptographic operations using thosekeys. (As used herein, the term “secure circuit” refers to a circuitthat protects an isolated, internal resource from being directlyaccessed by an external circuit.) As discussed below, this pairingoperation may rely on trusted server 130 to authenticate devices 110 and120 before permitting connection 122 to be established.

In some embodiments, peripheral device 110 is also configured to receivefirmware (FW) 124 as part of the pairing operation performed by devices110 and 120. In some embodiments, firmware 124 is received from trustedserver 130 via device 120 or received directly from device 120. Invarious embodiments, this firmware 124 may be executed by controller 115to implement various functionality described with respect to device 110during a portion of pairing operation and/or during communication overconnection 122. Accordingly, in some embodiments, firmware 124 may beexecutable to implement the encryption and decryption of informationtransmitted over connection 122. In some embodiments, receiving firmware124 during the paring operation allows device 110 to execute differentversions of firmware 124 as selected by computing devices 120. That is,device 110 may execute a first version of firmware 124 after pairingwith a first computing device 120 and then later execute a second,different version of the firmware 124 after pairing with a secondcomputing device 120. In some embodiments, device 110 is configuredverify the integrity of any received firmware 124 prior to performingany key exchange with device 120 and executing the firmware. Asdiscussed next, this verification may be based on information providedby trusted server 130.

Trusted server 130, in one embodiment, is a computer system that istrusted by devices 110 and 120 and configured to verify the identitiesof devices 110 and 120. In the illustrated embodiment, server 130 isconfigured to receive a verification request 132 and provideverification information 134 indicative of the results of theseverifications. Although shown as a single server, in some embodiments,server 130 may be one of multiple servers that implement a computercluster (i.e., cloud) configured to implement functionality describedherein with respect to server 130. In various embodiments, server 130maintains a list of authorized devices that are permitted to pair withone another. In such an embodiment, this list may include authenticationinformation that is able to uniquely identify a given device 110 or 120.In some embodiments, this authentication information may include adevice's serial number (or some other value that identifies a device),which may be stored in the device during fabrication of the device. Insome embodiments, this authentication information also includes a publickey certificate for each device 110 and 120, where each certificateincludes the public key used by that device. In such an embodiment, thecorresponding private key may be stored in the device during fabricationand is usable to authenticate the device by generating a digitalsignature verifiable using the public key stored on server 130. Invarious embodiments, server 130 is configured to also revoke devices 110and 120 as warranted by removing them from this list (or adding them toa blacklist in some embodiments).

In various embodiments, trusted server 130 is also configured to includeinformation in verification information 134 that is usable by device 110to verify firmware 124. In some embodiments, server 130 may maintain alist of acceptable versions of firmware 124. If the version of firmware124 to be used by device 110 is acceptable for execution, in someembodiments, server 130 may include a hash value of firmware 124 inverification information 134—the hash value being generated by applyinga hash function to firmware 124, such as a hash function in accordancewith a secure hash algorithm (SHA). Upon receiving this hash value,device 110 may compare this hash value with one that it generates fromthe received firmware 124 in order to verify the received firmware 124.In some embodiments, information 134 may also include a value (called an“epoch” as discussed below with FIG. 2) that identifies the lowestversion of firmware 124 that is acceptable to be executed by device 110.Accordingly, in verifying firmware 124, device 110 may also verify thatthe version of the received firmware 124 is in accordance with (e.g.,greater than or equal to) the epoch specified in information 134. Insome instances, if a particular version of firmware is determined to beproblematic, server 130 may update the epoch so that it identifies anewer version of firmware 124—and thus, revokes any older problematicversions in order to prevent them from being executed.

In various embodiments, trusted server 130 is configured to generateverification information 134 that cryptographically binds the identitiesof one or both of devices 110 and 120 to the particular firmware 124 tobe executed by device 110. As discussed below with respect to FIG. 4A,in various embodiments, devices 110 and 120 may perform an initialpairing operation that begins with computing device 120 collectingauthentication information from peripheral device 110 and conveying thatinformation along with authentication information for device 120 toserver 130 in a request 132. The request 132 may also include a hashvalue of the firmware 124 to be provided to device 110. In response to asuccessful verification of this authentication information and the hashvalue, server 130 may produce verification information 134 by generatingsigned data (i.e., one or more digital signatures) from all or a portionof the received authentication information and the received hash value.Devices 110 and/or 120 may then verify the signed data using the publickey identified in the server's public-key certificate. This verificationmay also include extracting the signed hash value and using it to verifyfirmware 124. If verification of the signed data fails (or server 130 isnot able to successfully verify the authentication information or thehash value), devices 110 and 120 may be configured to discontinue thepairing operation. In some embodiments, discontinuing of the paringoperation may occur prior to performance of any key exchange as thesigned authentication information may be used to establish a shared keybetween devices 110 and 120 as discussed below with FIG. 4A. If theverification is successful, device 110 may begin executing the receivedfirmware 124, and the pairing operation may proceed to completion.

Upon completion of a successful pairing operation, in variousembodiments, peripheral device 110 is configured to generate a tokenusable expedite subsequent pairing operations. As discussed below withrespect to FIGS. 2 and 4B, in various embodiments, device 110 isconfigured to use a keyed hash function to generate a token, which isprovided to device 120. When device 120 later attempts to perform apairing operation with device 110, device 120 may provide the previouslygenerated token (as opposed to obtaining verification information 134from server 130). Device 110 may then verify the provided token andproceed to complete the pairing operation with device 120. If, however,device 110 is unable to verify the token, device 110 may instruct device120 to fall back to performance of the initial pairing operation beforepairing can be successfully completed. In some embodiments, usage oftokens may permit a device 110 to not maintain state about previouspairings, which can result in significant memory savings when pairingwith multiple devices and having limited non-volatile memory. That is,rather than storing a record for each pairing with device 120, device110 can rely on the token to determine that pairing was previouslyauthorized by server 130. (In other embodiments, however, device 110 maystore state information from previous pairing operations instead ofusing tokens.) In some embodiments, usage of tokens may also permitpairing when communication with server 130 is not presentlyfeasible—e.g., when devices 110 and 120 are on a plane without Internetaccess.

Turning now to FIG. 2, a block diagram of peripheral device 110 isdepicted. In the illustrated embodiment, device 110 includes controller115, which includes one or more processors 210, random access memory(RAM) 220, non-volatile memory (NVM) 230, and read only memory (ROM)240. As shown, peripheral device 110 also includes one or more I/Ointerfaces 260 including a biosensor 260A. In the illustratedembodiment, RAM 220 includes firmware 124, nonce 224, and token 226. NVM230 includes one or more public-key pairs 232, a unique ID (UID) 234,and epoch 236. ROM 240 includes a server certificate 242 and generationinformation 244. In some embodiments, peripheral device 110 may beimplemented differently than shown. For example, elements 222-244 may bearranged differently among memories 220, 230, and 240.

As noted above, firmware 124, in one embodiment, is received from device120 and is executable to cause peripheral device 110 to performfunctionality described herein. In the illustrated embodiment, firmware124 is stored in a computer readable medium (i.e., RAM 220) and isexecutable by one or more of processors 210. In some embodiments,firmware 124 may be stored different than shown. In some embodiments,processors 210 may implement functionality described with respect to CPU320 below with FIG. 3; memories 220-240 may also implement functionalitydescribed with respect to memory 330.

Nonce 224, in one embodiment, is a numeric value that is generated bydevice 110 and included in the signed data provided by server 130 asdiscussed below with respect to FIG. 4A. As used herein, the term“nonce” is to be interpreted according to its understood meaning in theart, and includes an arbitrary number that is only used once in acryptographic operation. The inclusion of nonce 224 may prevent device120 from providing an older version of signed data from server 130,which may no longer be valid.

Token 226, in one embodiment, is a value that is generated by device 110and provided to device 120 in order to facilitate subsequent pairingoperations as discussed with respect to FIG. 4B. As noted above, token226 may be generated using a keyed hash function. Accordingly, in oneembodiment, token 226 is a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC)generated from device 120's public key, epoch 236, and a hash value offirmware 124. In such an embodiment, device 110 may use UID 234 as thekey for the HMAC. As noted above, use of a token 226 may allow device110 to not maintain state about a previous pairing. Rather, uponreceiving a token 226, device 110 may extract previously usedinformation such as device 120's public key, epoch 236, and the hashvalue of firmware 124.

Public key pairs 232, in one embodiment, are public and private keysused by device 110 to communicate with other devices such as computingdevice 120. In some embodiments, a given pair 232 is used to establish ashared key with device 120 using an ECDH key exchange. In someembodiments, keys of pairs 232 are ephemeral keys—i.e., keys that areonly used for a short amount of time, before being replaced.

Unique identifier (UID) 234, in one embodiment, is a private key storedin device 110 during fabrication. In various embodiments, device 110uses UID 234 to generate digital signatures for authenticating withtrusted server 130. In some embodiments, UID 234 is a longer term keyused to sign ephemeral keys 232 in order to establish that they belongto device 110.

Epoch 236, in one embodiment, is a stored value that indicates theminimum version of firmware 124 that device 110 is permitted to execute.In some embodiments, epoch 236 may be stored during fabrication, but maybe periodically updated by trusted server 130 when particular versionsof firmware 124 have been revoked due to various issues (e.g.,identified security vulnerabilities). In various embodiments, device 110is configured to compare epoch 236 with the version of received firmware124 in order to ensure that firmware 124 is at least this minimumversion.

Server certificate 242, in one embodiment, is a digital certificate fortrusted server 130 and includes the public key usable to verify anysigned data generated with server 130's corresponding private key.Accordingly, certificate 242 may be used to verify the integrity ofverification information 134 and extract data from information 134. Insome embodiments, certificate 242 is stored in device 110 duringfabrication of device 110.

Generation information 244, in one embodiment, is information describingdevice 110. In some embodiments, information 244 may include a serialnumber, make and model information, etc. In some embodiments,information 244 may be used to authenticate device 110 and select theappropriate firmware 124 for device 110.

I/O interfaces 260, in one embodiment, are interface devices configuredto collect user inputs and/or provide information to a user. In variousembodiments, information input into interfaces 260 and output byinterfaces 260 may be communicated securely over secure connection 122.As noted above, SEP 125 may perform encryption and decryption of thisinformation at device 120. Interfaces 260 may include any suitabledevices including, in some embodiments, a keyboard, a touch screen, amicrophone, biosensor 260A, any of peripherals 340 discussed below, etc.

Biosensor 260A, in one embodiment, is configured to detect biometricdata for a user of peripheral device 110. Biometric data may be datathat uniquely identifies the user among other humans (at least to a highdegree of accuracy) based on the user's physical or behavioralcharacteristics. For example, in some embodiments, sensor 260A is afinger print sensor that captures fingerprint data from the user. Insome embodiments, SEP 125 is configured to maintain previously capturedfingerprint data of an authorized user and compare it against newlyreceived fingerprint data from sensor 260A in order to authenticate auser. (In another embodiment, biosensor 260A may perform thecomparison.) If the fingerprint data matches, SEP 125 may permitperformance of a requested service—e.g., logging into computing device120. In some embodiments, communications between SEP 125 and biosensor260A may be encrypted over connection 122 such that another entity isunable to view communicated fingerprint data. In some embodiments, othertypes of biometric data may be captured by sensor 260A such as voicerecognition (identifying the particular user's voice), iris scanning,etc.

Turning now to FIG. 3, a block diagram of computing device 120 isdepicted. In the illustrated embodiments, computing device 120 includesCPU 320, SEP 125, memory 330, peripherals 340 coupled via acommunication fabric 350. As shown, CPU 320 may include one or moreprocessors P 322. In the illustrated embodiment, SEP 125 includes one ormore processors P 312, a secure memory 314, and one or more securityperipherals 316. SEP 114 may, however, include any desired circuitry(e.g. cryptographic hardware, hardware that accelerates certainoperations that are used in cryptographic functions, etc.). Accordingly,although depicted with a processor 312, in other embodiments, aprocessor may not be included.

As noted above, SEP 125 is a secure circuit configured to performvarious cryptographic operations in various embodiments. In variousembodiments, SEP 125 may be isolated from the rest of the computingdevice 120 except for a carefully controlled interface (thus forming asecure enclave for SEP processor 312, secure memory 314, and securityperipherals 316). Because the interface to SEP 125 is carefullycontrolled, direct access to SEP processor 312, secure memory 314, andsecurity peripherals 316 may be prevented. In one embodiment, a securemailbox mechanism may be implemented. In the secure mailbox mechanism,external devices may transmit messages to an inbox. SEP processor 312may read and interpret the message, determining the actions to take inresponse to the message. Response messages from the SEP processor 312may be transmitted through an outbox, which is also part of the securemailbox mechanism. Other interfaces that permit only the passing ofcommands/requests from the external components and results to theexternal components may be used. No other access from the externaldevices to SEP 125 may be permitted, and thus the SEP 125 may be“protected from access”. More particularly, software executed anywhereoutside SEP 125 may be prevented from direct access to the securecomponents with the SEP 125. SEP processor 312 may determine whether acommand is to be performed. In some cases, the determination of whetheror not to perform the command may be affected by the source of thecommand. That is, a command may be permitted from one source but notfrom another.

In some embodiments, SEP processor 312 may execute securely loadedsoftware that facilitates implementing functionality descried withrespect to SEP 125. For example, a secure memory 314 may includesoftware executable by SEP processor 312. One or more of the securityperipherals 316 may have an external interface, which may be connectedto a source of software (e.g. a non-volatile memory such as Flashmemory). In another embodiment, the source of software may be anon-volatile memory coupled to another peripheral 316, and the softwaremay be encrypted to avoid observation by a third party. The softwarefrom the source may be authenticated or otherwise verified as secure,and may be executable by SEP processor 312. In some embodiments,software may be loaded into a trust zone in memory 330 that is assignedto the SEP 125, and SEP processor 312 may fetch the software from thetrust zone for execution. The software may be stored in the memory 330in encrypted form to avoid observation. Despite the steps taken toensure security of the secure software, the secure software may still beprevented from directly accessing/obtaining stored private keys. Onlyhardware may have access to private keys, in an embodiment.

In the illustrated embodiment, secure memory 314 also includes one ormore public key pairs 318 and a unique identifier (UID) 319. Similar topairs 232 discussed above, pairs 318 are public and private keys used bydevice 120 to communicate with other devices such as device 110. In someembodiments, a given pair 318 is used (with a pair 232) to establish ashared key with device 120 using an ECDH key exchange. In someembodiments, keys of pairs 318 are ephemeral keys. In one embodimentdiscussed below with respect to FIG. 4A, the public key to be used in aECDH key exchanged is included in the signed data provided ininformation 134. Similar to UID 234, UID 319, in one embodiment, is aprivate key stored in device 120 during fabrication. In variousembodiments, device 120 uses UID 319 to generate digital signatures forauthenticating with trusted server 130. In some embodiments, UID 319 isa longer term key used to sign ephemeral keys in pairs 318 in order toestablish that they belong to device 120.

Security peripherals 316 may be hardware configured to assist in thesecure services performed by SEP 125. Accordingly, security peripherals316 may include authentication hardware implementing/acceleratingvarious authentication algorithms, encryption hardware configured toperform/accelerate encryption, secure interface controllers configuredto communicate over a secure interface to an external (to computingdevice 120) device, etc.

As mentioned above, CPU 320 may include one or more processors 322.Generally, a processor may include circuitry configured to executeinstructions defined in an instruction set architecture implemented bythe processor. Processors 322 may include (or correspond to) processorcores implemented on an integrated circuit with other components as asystem on a chip (SOC) or other levels of integration. Processors 322may further include discrete microprocessors, processor cores and/ormicroprocessors integrated into multichip module implementations,processors implemented as multiple integrated circuits, etc.

Processors 322 may execute the main control software of the system, suchas an operating system. Generally, software executed by CPU 320 duringuse may control the other components of the system to realize thedesired functionality of the system. The processors may also executeother software. These applications may provide user functionality, andmay rely on the operating system for lower-level device control,scheduling, memory management, etc. Accordingly, processors 322 (or CPU320) may also be referred to as application processors. CPU 320 mayfurther include other hardware such as an L2 cache and/or an interfaceto the other components of the system (e.g. an interface to thecommunication fabric 350).

Memory 330 may generally include the circuitry for storing data. Forexample, memory 330 may be static random access memory (SRAM), dynamicRAM (DRAM) such as synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) including double data rate(DDR, DDR2, DDR3, DDR4, etc.) DRAM. Low power/mobile versions of the DDRDRAM may be supported (e.g. LPDDR, mDDR, etc.). Device 120 may include amemory controller (not shown) that may include queues for memoryoperations, for ordering (and potentially reordering) the operations andpresenting the operations to the memory 330. The memory controller mayfurther include data buffers to store write data awaiting write tomemory and read data awaiting return to the source of the memoryoperation. In some embodiments, the memory controller may include amemory cache to store recently accessed memory data. In some embodimentsmemory 330 may include program instructions that are executable by oneor more processors 322 to cause device 120 to perform variousfunctionality described herein with respect to device 120.

Peripherals 340 may be any set of additional hardware functionalityincluded in device 120. For example, peripherals 340 may include videoperipherals such as an image signal processor configured to processimage capture data from a camera or other image sensor, displaycontrollers configured to display video data on one or more displaydevices, graphics processing units (GPUs), video encoder/decoders,scalers, rotators, blenders, etc. Peripherals 340 may include audioperipherals such as microphones, speakers, interfaces to microphones andspeakers, audio processors, digital signal processors, mixers, etc.Peripherals 340 may include interface controllers for various interfacesincluding interfaces such as Universal Serial Bus (USB), peripheralcomponent interconnect (PCI) including PCI Express (PCIe), serial andparallel ports, etc. Peripherals 340 may include networking peripheralssuch as media access controllers (MACs). Any set of hardware may beincluded.

Communication fabric 350 may be any communication interconnect andprotocol for communicating among the components of device 120.Communication fabric 350 may be bus-based, including shared busconfigurations, cross bar configurations, and hierarchical buses withbridges. Communication fabric 350 may also be packet-based, and may behierarchical with bridges, cross bar, point-to-point, or otherinterconnects.

Turning now to FIG. 4A, a communication diagram of an initial pairingoperation 400 is depicted. In various embodiments, initial pairingoperation 400 may be performed by elements 110-130 when devices 110 and120 have not been paired previously or are unable to successfullyperform pairing operation 450.

In the illustrated embodiment, pairing operation 400 begins withcomputing device 120 sending a request at 402 to peripheral device 110for its serial number and receiving a corresponding response at 404.Device 120 may also send a request at 406 for a nonce 224 and an epoch236, which may be provided in a response from device 110 at 408. In someembodiments, device 110 may sign the serial number, nonce, and/or epochwith UID 234. In some embodiments, different information may becollected by device 120 than what is shown in FIG. 4A.

Based on the received serial number and the epoch 236, device 120 maydetermine whether it currently stores a suitable version of firmware 124for device 110. If it does not include the appropriate version offirmware 124, in some embodiments, device 120 may issue a request forfirmware 124 at 410, which may be provided in a response at 412. Oncedevice 120 receives firmware 124 or determines to use a locally storedcopy, device 120 may generate a hash value of the firmware 124 shown asFW_(HV).

In the illustrated embodiment, computing device 120 then sends averification request 132 at 414 asking for a signature of device 120'spublic key C_(pub) (corresponding to a public key from a pair 318), thenonce, the received epoch 236, and the generated hash value. In someembodiments, this request 132 may also include additional informationfor signing such as the serial number, a public key of device 110, etc.;the request 132 may also be signed using UID 319. Trusted server 130 maythen verify the information in request 132 by using the maintained listdiscussed above with respect to FIG. 1. In response to a successfulverification, trusted server 130 may provide a verification information134 at 416 in FIG. 1 that includes a digital signature generated fromthe information included in request 132.

Once the digital signature is received, computing device 120 may providethe signature and firmware at 418 to device 110. Peripheral device 110may then confirm the validity of the signature by using certificate 242.Device 110 may also extract the signed hash value from the signature andcompare the extracted hash value with one generated from the receivedfirmware 124 in order to ensure the firmware 124 is valid. In someembodiments, device 110 may update its stored epoch 236 with the signedepoch in the signature, and confirm that the received firmware is incompliance with the stored epoch 236. If device 110 is able tosuccessfully verify the signature and firmware, device 110 may perform aboot of the firmware 124 at 420.

After the new firmware 124 is booted, peripheral device 110 may performa key exchange at 422 in order to establish a shared key to be used inexchanging encrypted information over connection 122. As discussedabove, this exchange may be employed using ECDH. In such an embodiment,device 110 may determine the shared key using the signed public keyC_(pub) in the received digital signature. Device 110 may also provideits public key (corresponding to a key in a pair 232), so that device120 is able to also derive the shared key.

Upon successfully completing the key exchange, device 110 may lastlygenerate a token 226 at 424. In the illustrated embodiment, device 110uses its UID 234 as a key to generate a message authentication code(MAC) from a hash value of Cpub (shown as C_(pub HV)), the current epoch236, a hash value of the received firmware 124. (In some embodiments inwhich a token is not generated, device 110 may merely store thisinformation, so that it can use it during a subsequent pairingoperation.) At 426, device 110 provides the token to device 120, so thatthe token can be used to expedite a subsequent pairing operation asdiscussed next.

Turning now to FIG. 4B, a communication diagram of a subsequent pairingoperation 450 is depicted. In various embodiments, subsequent pairingoperation 450 is performed by devices 110 and 120 once initial pairingoperation 400 has been successfully completed.

In the illustrated embodiment, operation 450 beings with device 120querying device 110 for its serial number at 452. Upon receiving theserial number at 454, computing device 120 may determine whether itstores any tokens 226 associated with the serial number. If it does,device 120 sends the token 226, firmware 124, and its public key C_(pub)at 456.

Upon receiving the token, device 110 may verify the token 226 and usethe token to verify firmware 124. In some embodiments, verifying thetoken may include device 110 recalculating the token 226 from thereceived information in a similar manner as at 424 and comparing thereceived token 226 with the recalculated token 226 in order to ensurethat they match. In doing so, device 110 is also verifying 1) thatdevice 120 is the same device it communicated with when the token wasgenerated and 2) that same firmware 124 executed previously is about tobe executed. If the tokens do not match, however, the received firmware124, public key Cpub, and/or epoch 236 may have changed. As a result,device 110 may instruct device 120 to fall back to performing initialpairing operation 400. If, however, the verification is successful,device 110 may again boot the firmware 124. At which point, device 110may perform a key exchange 460 with device 120 in a similar manner askey exchange 422 discussed above.

Turning now to FIG. 5, a flow diagram of method 500 is depicted. Method500 is one embodiment of a method that may be performed by a computersystem such as trusted server 130. In some instances, performing method500 may allow a more secure paring operation to be performed for thereasons noted above.

In step 510, a computer system receives, from a first device (e.g.,computing device 120), a request for a digital signature (e.g., request132) usable in a pairing operation between the first device to a seconddevice (e.g., peripheral device 110). In some embodiments, the computersystem storing a list indicative of devices permitted to pair with thesecond device and determines whether the first device is specified inthe list prior to proceeding to step 520.

In step 520, the computer system generates the requested digitalsignature (e.g., verification information 134) based on an identifier offirst device (e.g., a public key in a pair 318) and a hash value offirmware (e.g., firmware 124) to be executed by the second device. Insome embodiments, the computer system provides an epoch value (e.g.,epoch 236) to the second device, where the epoch value indicates aminimum version of firmware permitted to be executed by the seconddevice. Providing the epoch value causes the second device todiscontinue using the firmware associated with the digital signature. Insome embodiments, step 520 also includes the computer system providingthe firmware to first device, which conveys the firmware to the seconddevice during the pairing operation.

In various embodiments, method 500 may be repeated during subsequentpairing operations with other devices. Accordingly, a subsequentperformance may include the computer system receiving, from a thirddevice, a request for another digital signature usable in a pairingoperation between the third device to the second device, and thecomputer system generating the other requested digital signature basedon an identifier of third device and a hash value of firmware to beexecuted by the second device.

Although specific embodiments have been described above, theseembodiments are not intended to limit the scope of the presentdisclosure, even where only a single embodiment is described withrespect to a particular feature. Examples of features provided in thedisclosure are intended to be illustrative rather than restrictiveunless stated otherwise. The above description is intended to cover suchalternatives, modifications, and equivalents as would be apparent to aperson skilled in the art having the benefit of this disclosure.

The scope of the present disclosure includes any feature or combinationof features disclosed herein (either explicitly or implicitly), or anygeneralization thereof, whether or not it mitigates any or all of theproblems addressed herein. Accordingly, new claims may be formulatedduring prosecution of this application (or an application claimingpriority thereto) to any such combination of features. In particular,with reference to the appended claims, features from dependent claimsmay be combined with those of the independent claims and features fromrespective independent claims may be combined in any appropriate mannerand not merely in the specific combinations enumerated in the appendedclaims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A first device, comprising: one or moreprocessors; and memory having program instructions stored therein thatare executable by the one or more processors to cause the first deviceto: perform a pairing operation with a second device to establish asecure communication link between the first device and the seconddevice, wherein the pairing operation includes: receiving firmware fromthe second device to be executed by the first device duringcommunication over the secure communication link; and in response to asuccessful verification of the firmware, establishing a sharedencryption key to be used by the first and second devices during thecommunication.
 2. The first device of claim 1, wherein the pairingoperation includes: receiving, from a computer system, a digitalsignature created from a hash value of the firmware and a public key ofthe second device; and verifying the firmware by extracting the hashvalue from the digital signature and comparing the extracted hash valuewith a hash value of the received firmware.
 3. The first device of claim2, wherein the pairing operation includes using the public key toestablish the shared encryption key.
 4. The first device of claim 1,wherein the program instructions are executable to cause the firstdevice to: store a value indicating a minimum version of the firmwarethat is permissible to be executed by the first device; and wherein thepairing operation includes verifying that a version of the receivedfirmware is equal to or greater than the minimum version.
 5. The firstdevice of claim 4, wherein the program instructions are executable tocause the first device to: receive an updated value indicating anotherversion of the firmware as the minimum version permissible to beexecuted by the first device; and replace the stored value with theupdated value.
 6. The first device of claim 1, wherein the programinstructions are executable to cause the first device to: perform asubsequent pairing operation with the second device, wherein thesubsequent pairing operation includes: receiving firmware from thesecond device; and verifying the firmware received during the pairingoperation matches the firmware received during the subsequent pairingoperation.
 7. The first device of claim 6, wherein the pairing operationincludes the first device providing, to the second device, a tokengenerated based on an identity of the second device and a hash value ofthe firmware received during the pairing operation; and wherein thesubsequent pairing operation includes: receiving the token from thesecond device; and verifying that the hash value associated with thetoken matches a hash value of the firmware received during thesubsequent pairing operation.
 8. The first device of claim 6, whereinthe pairing operation includes the first device storing a hash value ofthe firmware received during the pairing operation and an identity ofthe second device; and wherein the subsequent pairing operationincludes: verifying, based on the stored hash value, that the firmwarereceived during the subsequent pairing is the firmware received duringthe pairing operation; and verifying, based on the stored identity, thatthe firmware received during the subsequent pairing is from the seconddevice.
 9. The first device of claim 1, further comprising: a biosensorconfigured to capture biometric information of a user, wherein theprogram instructions are executable to cause the first device tocommunicate the captured biometric information over the securecommunication link.
 10. The first device of claim 9, further comprising:a keyboard configured to capture an input from a user, wherein theprogram instructions are executable to cause the first device tocommunicate the captured input over the secure communication link.
 11. Afirst device, comprising: one or more processors; memory having programinstructions stored therein that are executable by the one or moreprocessors to cause the first device to: perform a pairing operationwith a second device to establish a secure communication link betweenthe first and second devices, wherein the pairing operation includes:receiving, from a computer system, signed data that binds an identifierof the first device to firmware to be executed by the second device; andsending the signed data and the firmware to the second device.
 12. Thefirst device of claim 11, wherein the pairing operation includes:receiving a nonce from the second device; and sending a request for thesigned data to the computer system, wherein the request specifies thenonce, and wherein the signed data binds the nonce to the identifier ofthe first device and to the firmware.
 13. The first device of claim 11,further comprising: a secure circuit configured to: store a shared keygenerated during the pairing operation; and use the stored key todecrypt information received over the secure communication link from thesecond device.
 14. The first device of claim 13, wherein the identity ofthe first device is a public key of the first device; and wherein thesecure circuit is configured to: use a private key corresponding to thepublic key to generate the shared key via an elliptic curvediffie-hellman (ECDH) protocol.
 15. The first device of claim 11,wherein the pairing operation includes: receiving, from the seconddevice, a token usable to authenticate the first device to the seconddevice during a subsequent pairing operation.
 16. A method, comprising:a computer system receiving, from a first device, a request for adigital signature usable in a pairing operation between the first deviceand a second device; and the computer system generating the requesteddigital signature based on an identifier of first device and a hashvalue of firmware to be executed by the second device.
 17. The method ofclaim 16, further comprising: the computer system providing an epochvalue to the second device, wherein the epoch value indicates a minimumversion of firmware permitted to be executed by the second device,wherein the providing causes the second device to discontinue using thefirmware associated with the digital signature.
 18. The method of claim16, further comprising: the computer system storing a list indicative ofdevices permitted to pair with the second device; and the computersystem determining whether the first device is specified in the listprior to generating the requested digital signature.
 19. The method ofclaim 16, further comprising: the computer system receiving, from athird device, a request for another digital signature usable in apairing operation between the third device to the second device; and thecomputer system generating the other requested digital signature basedon an identifier of third device and a hash value of firmware to beexecuted by the second device.
 20. The method of claim 16, furthercomprising: the computer system providing the firmware to first device,wherein the first device conveys the firmware to the second deviceduring the pairing operation.